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INSTITUTIONAL COHERENCE AND THE EVOLUTION 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN POLAND
|  A b s t r a c t
 ‣ Goal – the purpose of the article is to present the significance and role of institutional 
coherence in the development and evolution of corporate governance in Poland.
 ‣ Research methodology – a review of the literature on examining the specificity of 
knowledge about the role of institutional coherence in the development and evolu-
tion of corporate governance in Poland and analysis and assessment of the changes 
in good practice codes in Poland.
 ‣ Score/results – a systemic approach to the issue of corporate governance reveals that 
it is a collection of both formal and informal institutions. Through mutual interac-
tion, corporate governance rules lead to the emergence of a relatively stable and 
predictable environment in which enterprises and their stakeholders can operate.
 ‣ Originality/value – analysis of good practice codes in Poland reveals that the process 
of their adjustment to the current social and cultural norms, as well as to the expec-
tations of the market, can be positively evaluated, as evidenced by the fact that their 
new editions continue to be published. The provisions which appear in good practice 
codes year by year adequately reflect the needs and expectations of the market.
|Keywords:  good practice codes, corporate governance, formal institutions, infor-
mal institutions, optional rules.
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1. Introduction
Corporate governance is among the most dynamically developing themes in 
the field of social sciences. Depending on the research perspective, corporate 
governance is perceived either as an element of a larger system of interdepen­
dencies – encompassing the legal and financial systems – or as a subsystem of the 
relationships among various areas, combining elements of law, politics, economy, 
and society. In the narrow sense, corporate governance is very often understood 
as a segment of commercial law, a set of legal provisions regulating the systems 
and the functioning of joint stock companies, or – broadly speaking – as a set 
of recommendations and good practices according to which such companies 
should operate. An even wider perspective takes into account not only the above­
­mentioned areas: legal regulations, “soft laws” and their applications, but also 
the entire institutional system that accompanies them. In this article, we use the 
above interdisciplinary understanding of corporate governance. Not only does it 
reflect the multilayered and multidimensional nature of the issue in question as 
well as its importance for economic, political and social life, but it also indicates 
the interactions between these systems, identifying their interdependencies.
The purpose of the article is to present the significance and role of institu-
tional coherence in the development and evolution of corporate governance in 
Poland. The theoretical section provides clarification of the terms used further 
below, e.g. institutions, institutional coherence, and corporate governance. The 
empirical part contains analysis and assessment of the changes in good practice 
codes (an instrument of corporate governance) in Poland, in the context of their 
adaptation to the applicable social and cultural standards as well to market ex-
pectations, i.e. the expectations of various groups of stakeholders of companies 
under corporate governance systems.
2. Institutions and institutional coherence
Institutional analyses are common in many social sciences, including law, socio­
logy, economics, and political science. Each of these fields has developed, for 
its own needs, a different definition of institution. Table 1 contains examples 
of how the term is defined in the areas of law, economics, and sociology. It can 
be noticed that the definitions intertwine and complement each other. In the 
literature, institutions are perceived as: principles, constraints, thinking pat-
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terns, points of balance, structures, means to certain ends, organisations, signs 
and symbols1. Encyclopaedically, a legal institution is a set of legislative norms 
jointly regulating a given social relation (e.g. the institution of marriage, the 
institution of ownership, or the institution of market contracts). By law, what 
is subject to regulation is a specific social relation between at least two entities. 
These regulations comprise certain rights and obligations prescribed by law. 
Such a collection is what constitutes an institution in the legal sense [Borkowska, 
Klimczak, Klimczak, 2019: 71]. From a sociological perspective, the material 
scope of an institution is wider than from the legal perspective. This is due to 
the fact that the expressions of the norms and patterns which govern the activity 
of groups and communities stem not only from the law, but also from tradition 
or religion. Economists assume that institutions are moral principles, customs, 
individual mentalities, as well as legal and social rules, which have been shaped 
throughout history and which provide a basis for economic processes. Institu-
tions organise, control and influence economic processes in such a way that 
they proceed smoothly and with due regard to the interests of all the partners.



















Source: Borkowska, klimczak, klimczak, 2019: 84.
 1 The subject literature offers numerous definitions of the term institution. For example 
Sławomir Czech proposes eight explanations, adding that his conceptualisation does 
not exhaust the topic, but allows for noticing a wide analytical usefulness of this notion 
[Czech, 2019: 32]. 
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The primary role of an institution is to reduce uncertainty by developing 
relatively constant principles of behaviour for individuals and economic entities. 
Thanks to them, the behaviours of individuals become more predictable, whereas 
the risk and transaction costs which accompany exchange are decreased. While 
initially exchange was direct in nature and relied on informal institutions, nowa-
days transactions require more advanced institutions since they occur remotely, 
impersonally, or involve large numbers of contractors. When trust between the 
contracting parties is lacking, co­operation is only possible via institutions. To-
day, reduction of uncertainty requires appropriate rules or guidelines, i.e. formal 
institutions, both economic and political [Rudolf, 2014: 157].
A system of institutions constitutes a multi­level, multi­faceted structure of 
laws, rules, and norms which in every society impacts people’s decisions and 
behaviour [Gruszewska, 2017: 38]. Therefore, an institutional system consists 
of both formal and informal institutions [North, 1990: 4, 36]. As John Carey 
remarked, “not all written rules serve as effective constraints on political behavior, 
and, conversely, […] not all effective constraints on social behavior are written 
rules” [Carey, 2000: 737].
Formal institutions are comprised of all kinds of legal and constitutional 
norms which are developed by legislative bodies and whose role is to regulate 
economic and political relations [North, 1990]. The legal literature refers to this 
kinds of institutions as civil law (ius civile). The state guarantees that such law 
is respected. Among formal institutions, a significant role is played by property 
law and contract law. Formal institutions encompass the system of property 
laws, (normative civil) law, and (public, social, real sphere, and financial sector) 
regulations. These usually function as part of a hierarchical structure, including 
the constitution as the superior legal norm, various collections of legal acts, 
administrative, technical, and economic rules [Fiedor, 2015: 94].
Informal institutions are social principles and norms observed by members 
of certain groups when these strive to pursue common objectives. They include 
codes of conduct, conventions and norms of behaviour which emerge during 
interactions between individuals. Informal institutions are deeply embedded 
in the culture of a given society [Wilkin, 2016]. Sometimes they come into 
existence as a result of the historical process of generation­to ­generation trans-
fer (through learning and imitation) of knowledge, values, and other factors 
which influence human behaviour. Informal institutions can also be created as 
supplements and additions to formal rules and can, moreover, be contradictory 
to formal institutions [Helmke, Levitsky, 2004: 727]. This is because informal 
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rules may be established in order to circumvent formal rules or to perform ac-
tions which are unpopular or illegal. The key difference between informal and 
formal institutions is that the former remain in the private sphere (but apply to 
the entire community), whereas the latter are centrally designed, implemented, 
and enforced [Williamson 2009: 372].
Although modern economies attach great importance to legal norms and 
regulations, social norms, which can be supplementary to them, must not be 
forgotten. Empirical studies show that informal rules are a social pillar for the 
credibility of concluded contracts, a factor which reinforces formal property 
laws, and an element of the social order which permanently lowers transaction 
costs [Williamson, 2009]. In scientific research, the role of informal institutions 
should not be reduced to that of the “missing variable”. Instead of just assuming 
the existence of informal institutions, it is preferable that the borders between 
formal and informal rules, as well as their efficiency and mutual interactions, 
are clarified [Grzymala­Busse, 2010: 331]. Informal institutions play a vital part 
in co­ordinating economic activity through mechanisms of trust, reputation, and 
business networking [Kostro, 2004: 75–80].
Institutions do not come into being in isolation from other institutions, but 
are formed in relation to organisations that exist alongside them, and are con-
tinuations of those that existed before them [Gruszewska, 2017: 39]. Formal and 
informal institutions interact with each other both at the stage of their creation 
and in the course of their operation. There are several types of relationships 
between formal and informal institutions [Bentkowska, 2020: 26]:
1) Formal institutions are complemented with informal ones. This happens, 
for instance, when agreements are not sufficiently regulated to ensure their 
appropriate execution, but people adhere to the rules of honest conduct, 
thanks to which agreements are complied with;
2) Informal institutions are consistent with formal institutions, reinforcing 
their effect. For instance, when agreements are adequately regulated, peo-
ple also strive to act with integrity. Harmony between these two types of 
rules determines long­term economic success.
3) Formal institutions directly interfere with informal rules. This is the case, 
e.g. when legal provisions prohibit corruption, but society approves of 
bribery and resorts to offering financial advantages to public officials in 
order to unlawfully accomplish goals.  In such a situation, when a legal 
provision does not play its regulatory function, it can be socially perceived 
as ‘dead letter’, something that exists only ‘on paper’.
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4) Formal institutions can be modified by informal ones. This occurs when 
there is a discrepancy between them. If this is the case, the regulation 
which is inconsistent with informal institutions can eventually be altered.
5) Informal institutions can lead to the creation of new formal institutions. 
For instance, whenever members of society condemned theft, as law de-
veloped, misappropriation of someone else’s property came to be banned 
and later punished.
Mutual adjustment of institutions is necessary for a system to be a source 
of relatively coherent stimuli that have an effect on economic activity. Sveto-
zar Pejovich proposed a theory known as ‘the interaction thesis’, according to 
which mutual influence among formal and informal institutions is the key factor 
behind economic stability and the rate of economic growth [Pejovich, 1999: 
171]. If formal institutions are in conflict with informal norms, their enforce-
ment will be costly, which will cause a rise in transaction costs and a reduction 
in wealth creation capacity. And conversely, where formal norms are in line 
with informal ones, the cost of implementing the former will be relatively 
low and they will be accepted, supported, and subsequently developed, thus 
decreasing transaction costs and organising resources in such a manner that 
they are conducive to wealth creation [Fuentelsaz, González, Maicas, 2019: 8]. 
Informal institutions may impede the positive effects of new formal rules, but 
they can also mitigate some negative effects of inappropriate formal institutions 
[Chavance, 2010: 60–61].
Informal institutions are the original pattern for the construction of formal 
ones. Rules which arise in the course of long­term activity and experience, be-
come widespread and, with time, may assume a formal character. This happens 
slowly and gradually. Thanks to repeated activities and uniform codes of practice 
under specific circumstances, patterns of behaviour may become established. 
Society must also be convinced of the efficiency of these solutions and of the 
need for their formalisation. The subsystem of formal institutions undergoes 
gradual change as it adjusts itself to the changes in the real sphere. This process 
leads to the creation of a sustainable system, under which most group interests 
are respected [Gruszewska, 2017: 43].
Efficient design of good institutional solutions must ensure that the two 
institutional subsystems mutually strengthen and complement each other – the 
so­called institutional coherence and complementarity are of the utmost im-
portance. Firstly, the principles of operation laid down by informal and formal 
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institutions must be similar and non­contradictory. Only coherent institutions 
can permanently co­exist and provide a stable foundation for business activities. 
Secondly, institutions must be complementary. Not only must they not be mutual­
ly exclusive, but they also have to complement one another where necessary. 
In an area where a legal norm is lacking, an informal norm which will regulate 
this area should arise. If, for instance, because of legislative gaps, property rights 
are not protected, appropriately developed informal institutions which exclude 
dishonesty and promote trust or mutual understanding can take over the role 
of formal rules [Bentkowska, 2020: 37].
3. Corporate governance as an institutional system
Corporate governance is perceived as a solution applied “[…] at the system level 
and which defines the framework of the operation of companies that are part 
of the institutional order” [Aluchna, 2015: 9]. A corporate governance system 
comprises legal regulations, the activity of government departments, company 
bodies, managerial staff, investors, as well as all the other stakeholders [Cadbury, 
1999: 12–19]. Weimer and Pape take the view that it is “[…] a more or less 
country­specific framework of legal, institutional and cultural factors shaping the 
pattern of influences which stakeholders exert on managerial decision­making” 
[Weimer, Pape, 2006: 152].
Among the factors which determine the shape of corporate governance, 
Weimer and Pape mention [Weimer, Pape, 2006: 152]:
• the concept of a company which is prevalent in a given country,
• the principles and structures of boards of directors/supervisory boards,
• the ownership structure,
• the impact of passive shareholders on management processes,
• the dependencies between the salaries of managers and the results of com-
panies,
• the time horizon of economic relations between shareholders; the existence 
or lack thereof of an external market for control of corporate activity,
• the significance of stock exchange for an economy.
Tom Cannon, who offers a systemic perspective on corporate governance, 
limits the number of factors which influence corporate governance systems to 
only four [Cannon, 1994: 165]:
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• legal and institutional system,
• rules governing ownership and ownership structures,
• operating principles and structures of boards,
• social pressure.
This proves that the division into formal and informal institutions can be 
useful when analysing corporate governance systems. Some of the institutions 
which are part of corporate governance have a formal character and their 
establishment is mandated by the existing law. This group includes: general 
meetings of shareholders, boards of directors, supervisory boards, company 
management, some of the board committees, their statutes, company staff, their 
representatives on boards, and trade unions. Also, the so­called good practice 
codes belong to the category of formal institutions. These codes can be treated 
as an example of an institution created in order to reduce uncertainty, since 
they emerge as a response to growing uncertainty, mainly felt by small inves-
tors, but also by society as a whole. They primarily apply to large companies 
because in their case uncertainty is particularly acute and harmful. Codes of 
good practices ensure increased social control over companies, requiring of 
them that their activities are transparent and that their decisions are more 
rational, etc. This kind of control should result in greater social trust in com-
panies, as well as in their management and control systems. Increased trust, 
in turn, usually leads to overcoming the reluctance of investors, particularly 
smaller ones, enhancing their willingness to purchase stocks or shares [Rudolf, 
2014: 158].
Informal institutions are those which, to a large extent, influence the di-
versity and individual character of companies, which is not without an effect 
on the achieved results. Among informal institution are, e.g.: moral and ethical 
principles, traditions, culture, propensity for opportunistic behaviour, etc. [Ru-
dolf, 2014: 157].
Reports by the OECD stress that “corporate governance is only part of the 
larger economic context in which firms operate that includes, for example, macro­
economic policies and the degree of competition in product and factor markets. 
The corporate governance framework also depends on the legal, regulatory, and 
institutional environment” [OECD, 2004: 12]. Despite the lack of binding authori­
ty, the developed standards of corporate governance are based on the existing 
legislative framework, which confirms the fact that it is perfectly justified that 
they should be adhered to [OECD, 2005: 60]. At the same time, the proposed 
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recommendations result from economic stimuli which determine the direction 
in which corporate governance regulations evolve. Understanding, acceptance, 
and recognition of these recommendations are crucially important for their 
implementation. Unlike in the case of normative acts, legal sanction has been 
replaced with the force of argument and the substantive accuracy of proposed 
recommendations. Entities which implement corporate governance guidelines 
in particular countries can adjust those guidelines to the socio­economic, legal, 
and cultural circumstances of the economies in which they operate.
On a company level, corporate governance aims to improve the efficiency 
of entities through providing conditions conducive to improving the quality of 
co­operation among various interest groups involved in their operation. A corpo-
rate governance system offers a structure by means of which it is possible to set 
company goals, identify the means of their implementation and methods to verify 
the accomplished outcomes. Good corporate governance is meant to stimulate 
company bodies and managerial staff to attain objectives whose rea lisation is 
in the interest of a wide range of stakeholders. At the level of an economy, an 
efficient corporate governance system “helps to provide a degree of confidence 
that is necessary for the proper functioning of a market economy. As a result, 
the cost of capital is lower and firms are encouraged to use resources more effi-
ciently, thereby underpinning growth” [OECD, 2004: 12].
Due to the recommendations proposed in good practice codes, corporate 
governance systems are becoming key institutions which determine the develop-
ment of the capital market and play a significant role in the modern free market 
economy [Godlewska, Pilewicz, 2018: 86]. What is more, the recommendations 
are of evolutionary nature, which means that they should be modified to keep 
up with the changing reality in order to fully answer the needs of the stakehold-
ers. The effects of the evolution of corporate governance are also noticeable in 
Poland, as is exemplified by amended good practice codes.
4. Evolution of good practice codes in Poland
Corporate governance good practice codes are sets of recommendations aiming 
to indicate appropriate standards for corporate governance systems. They are 
not legal provisions and have no binding authority. They are collections of 
guidelines which are intended to help fill the gaps between legislative acts and 
market mechanisms [Blejer­Gołębiowska, 2012: 56].
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By pursuing the basic objective of protecting the economic interests of the 
investors that have entrusted their capital to joint­stock companies, they enable 
market actors to hold enterprises accountable for their policies, simultaneously 
preventing overregulation and bureaucratisation of the capital market. This 
benefit is highlighted by K. A. Lis and H. Sterniczuk, who argue that in the case of 
a low level of governance formality and a considerable role of informal norms and 
traditional values, introducing formal regulations and strict laws may increase 
the cost of governance and make law abidance more onerous, consequently 
leading to a decreased interest in the public market [Lis, Sterniczuk, 2005: 21].
In Poland, good practice codes have a nearly twenty year history, as illus-
trated by Table 2. Among the initiators of good practice codes are: institutions 
supporting the transformation of the Polish economy and state, the stock ex-
change, associations of entities offering financial products and services, organi-
sations and institutions representing the interests of customers, and other market 
institutions, with input from academic experts.








2002 Gdansk	Institute	for	Market	Economics	(IBnGR) White Book of Corporate Governance
2002 The	Polish	Corporate	Governance	Forum Corporate Governance Code
2002 The	Polish	Corporate	Governance	Forum
Good Practices in Public Companies 
2002
2004 The	Polish	Corporate	Governance	Forum







Code of Good Practice
for Institutional Investors





Canon of Good Financial
Market Practices









2010 The	Warsaw	Stock	Exchange Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies 2010
2012 The	Warsaw	Stock	Exchange Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies 2012
2013 The	Warsaw	Stock	Exchange Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies 2013










Canon of Good Financial 
Market Practices
2021 The	Warsaw	Stock	Exchange Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies 2021
Source: author’s own work based on www.ibngr.pl [date of access: 20.08.2021], www.pfcg.org.pl [date 
of access: 20.08.2021], www.gpw.pl [date of access: 20.08.2021], www.skok.pl/wp-content/
uploads/2018/07/kanon‑dobrych­‑praktyk‑rynku‑finansowego.pdf­[date­of­access:­20.08.2021].
The corporate governance recommendations included in good practice codes 
undergo periodical analysis and, should the need arise, are modified. As a result, 
they enable “[…] efficient management, effective supervision, respecting share-
holder rights, and transparent communication with the market”2.
Good practices of stock exchange listed companies “[…] as a set of corpo-
rate governance rules and principles of conduct which have a major impact on 
the relations between listed companies and their market environment are an 
important component of building the competitive position of these companies, 
significantly contributing to increasing the attractiveness of the Polish capital 
market” [GPW, 2021: 3]. To attain this goal, they must meet the current needs 
of the economy as well as the entities which operate within it.
 2 See: www.gpw.pl/dobre­praktyki2021 [date of access: 20.08.2021].
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Good practice codes must be amended since there is a need to continually 
adjust formal institutions to the evolving informal institutions. As corporate 
governance rules aspire to provide an ethical and cultural paradigm, they strive 
to respond to the problems encountered by the participants of the capital mar-
ket. In order to rise to this challenge, the contents of good practice codes are 
consulted with issuers, investors, as well as institutions interested in enhancing 
the quality of corporate order in listed companies and with the representatives 
of scientific communities, who indicate new areas of activity. This is why their 
authors endeavour to design rules and recommendations which will cater for the 
needs of companies and their stakeholders. For instance, after consultations with 
capital market participants and following their suggestions, the code of good 
practices published in 2021 takes into consideration issues associated with ESG, 
including those relating to climate protection, sustainable development, diver-
sity in the composition of company boards, and equal pay. It also mentions the 
previously indicated weaknesses of the Polish capital market, e.g. the problem 
of equal treatment of shareholders, the methods of profit sharing, issue of shares 
with the exclusion of subscription rights, or buyback of own shares. Attention 
was drawn to the need for adequate substantive and organisational quality 
of the general meeting, which would involve setting deadlines for submitting 
draft resolutions by shareholders, procedures for submission of candidates for 
supervisory boards, and the processes of their appointment in accordance with 
diversity policies [GPW, 2021: 3].
The rules of corporate governance developed in the form of good practice 
codes are based on the ‘comply or explain’ principle. Companies are obliged to 
implement guidelines or explain the reasons for failing to comply with them. 
Practice has shown that the recommendations sometimes eventually find a re-
flection in legislative provisions. If this happens, they are removed from good 
practice codes since these are supposed to be in line with the binding legislation 
but not to duplicate legal regulations.
Amended good practice codes follow the trends and solutions accepted in 
the field of corporate governance in other countries. They are also an answer 
to the demands of market participants interested in higher quality of corporate 
governance in listed companies. However, it must be admitted that merely chang-
ing the provisions will not in itself improve the quality of the capital market 
[Oplustil, 2010: 54]. They must also be actively implemented and enforced. 
It is also prerequisite that companies are monitored and held accountable for 
compliance with the recommendations.
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5. Conclusions
A systemic approach to the issue of corporate governance reveals that it is a col-
lection of both formal and informal institutions. Through mutual interaction, 
corporate governance rules lead to the emergence of a relatively stable and pre-
dictable environment in which enterprises and their stakeholders can operate. 
Among the effects of corporate governance systems are good practice codes, 
containing recommendations which respond to the expectations of market actors 
interested in higher standards of corporate order. In view of the dynamically 
changing realities, good practice codes are periodically reviewed and consulted 
so as to meet the current needs as adequately as possible. Informal institutions 
in the form of principles of conduct, social norms, conventions and behavioural 
patterns are thereby transformed into formal institutions. As is inherent in the 
concept of corporate governance, by creating behaviour patterns, the proposed 
rules convince people of their validity through economic arguments, e.g. proving 
that certain objectives can be achieved thanks to policies implemented with their 
help. To make this possible, it is necessary to maintain institutional coherence, 
as intended by the authors of the codes.
Analysis of good practice codes in Poland reveals that the process of their 
adjustment to the current social and cultural norms as well as the expectations 
of the market can be positively evaluated, as evidenced by the fact that their 
new editions continue to be published. The provisions which appear in good 
practice codes year by year adequately reflect the needs and expectations of the 
market. Some of them are modified, others discarded, while still others become 
part of economic law.
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